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ABSTRACT  
This paper presents the findings of research carried out into the information seeking 
behaviour, and information requirements, of a small sample of international workers 
stationed in West Africa during the Zaire Ebola virus outbreak of 2014–15. The research 
study under which these results were obtained was part of exploratory research for a PhD 
focused on the use, and potential uses, of social media platforms during serious disease 
outbreaks that might be used to inform policy planning for public health and emergency 
response interventions. Thus, the findings from this study may provide valuable insights to 
business continuity managers and emergency planners in making future decision about 
information exchange and crisis decision-making during future serious disease outbreaks. 
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INTRODUCTION  
This paper presents the findings of research carried out into the information seeking 
behaviour, and information requirements, of a small sample (n=14) of international workers 
stationed in West Africa during the Zaire ebolavirus outbreak of 2014–15. While a larger 
sample would have been preferable, the available resources for the study, and the timescale 
available, placed restrictions on the sample size. Further research during a future disease 
outbreak will be needed to verify and test these findings. 
The research study under which these results were obtained was part of exploratory 
research for a PhD focused on the use, and potential uses, of social media platforms during 
serious disease outbreaks that might be used to inform policy planning for public health and 
emergency response interventions. The World Health Organization Outbreak Communication 
Planning Guide1 states: ‘pro-active communication encourages the public to adopt protective 
behaviours, facilitates heightened disease surveillance, reduces confusion and allows for a 
better allocation of resources – all of which are necessary for an effective response’. Funk 
and Jansen2 have modelled the potential impact that human behaviour might have on slowing 
and containing disease outbreaks. Social media use among the research cohort was 
unfortunately low (due primarily to a combination of low Internet penetration in the affected 
regions), but nonetheless valuable insights were gained into the information that users looked 
for, the sources from which they wanted to obtain it and were most likely to trust and how 
they shared this with friends and colleagues. 
Interviews were conducted with 14 employees of international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), international organisations and international businesses with 
operations in West Africa, between 8th July and 5th November 2014. Ten were (or had been) 
stationed in Liberia and four in Sierra Leone. Eleven of the interviewees were women, three 
were men and they ranged in age from mid-twenties to late-fifties. The cohort was recruited 
mainly through a request posted on the ‘Liberia Expats’ GoogleGroup, a members-only 
GoogleGroup for people who are, or who have previously been, working in Liberia. A brief 
description of the aims of the research was posted on the message forum, to which members 
who wanted to volunteer themselves could respond. The participants from Sierra Leone were 
recruited through purposive convenience sampling of people known by the author or her 
colleagues to be currently working in the affected region(s).  
Study inclusion criteria were that the interviewee had to speak English, so that they 
could be interviewed verbally, be either currently in one of the Ebola-affected countries 
(Liberia, Sierra Leone or Guinea) or have returned from one of them since the outbreak 
began.  
All interviews were conducted over Skype, with the exception of two: one that was 
conducted face-to-face with an interviewee who had recently returned from Liberia to her 
home in Washington DC and was available for interview when the author was also in the 
city; the other was completed by e-mail questionnaire after the Internet connection proved too 
poor to sustain a Skype session. All interviews were audio-recorded (using iFree Skype 
Recorder software) and transcribed by the author (with the exception of the interview 
conducted by e-mail) and the transcriptions were sent to the interviewees for verification and 
amendment. Interviewees were given the option at this stage to add in additional points they 
had not covered during the interview itself. The recorded interviews varied in length from 13 
minutes 38 seconds to one hour, nine minutes and 36 seconds, with an average length of 35 
minutes. 
 
RESULTS  
Remembering  the  message  source  
Wathen and Burkell3 describe four characteristics of messages that contribute to how well 
they are trusted: source characteristics (who has sent the message); message characteristics 
(relevant to the content and how it is presented); medium (the channel or system through 
which the message is transmitted and received); receiver characteristics (relating to the 
person who receives the message). In this study, the source characteristics proved to be much 
more important than the medium through which the message was received.  
In general, the interviewees did not remember clearly where they had first heard about 
the Ebola outbreak, who they had received the information from or how they had received it. 
All of those interviewed consumed information from many sources across many platforms 
and while they remembered the content of the message, and to some extent its source, they 
were less likely to remember the precise medium. Their recall can be grouped into three 
broad source categories: (1) official information sources, which includes government and 
international agencies such as the Liberian Ministry of Health, the American Embassy in 
Liberia, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the US Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC); (2) professional media, including international media such as BBC World Service, 
CNN and Al-Jazeera, and local professional media including newspapers and radio shows; 
(3) informal information sources, including friends and family, from whom communication 
was received by word of mouth, by e-mail or over social media platforms such as Twitter and 
Facebook. Recall was, generally, no more specific than this – ‘BBC, Al-Jazeera, something 
along those lines, on the web or on TV’. 
Throughout later information-seeking behaviour, interviewees maintained a 
distinction between the three categories outlined above. This affected how they trusted and 
processed information from each, although generally they tended to use all three 
simultaneously. 
 
Multiple-­message  sourcing  
The following response is typical: 
‘I heard about [cases of Ebola] from friends, and then I went and looked it up on the 
news later ... I would generally look at BBC, Al-Jazeera, something along those lines, 
on the web or on TV, or I would read the WHO website’. 
Another said: 
‘[P]art of the problem was that the government and the Ministry of Health wouldn’t 
confirm anything until they’d got the test results back, but everyone knew when there 
was a suspected case. Everyone would sit around and call who they knew at the 
hospital and try this, that and the other to figure it out’. 
Information heard through informal sources was generally considered to be rumour, which 
interviewees would try to confirm though official sources and the more trusted professional 
media.  
This multiple-source information gathering was something the interviewees wanted 
and sought out, as the following reply shows: 
‘I was just reading anything attached to it, I was reading all of the media on it, 
everything I could find on it from different sources – Google, journal articles ... all the 
media, I was reading everything I could find’. 
This did not confuse the interviewees, nor cause information overload, but helped to 
reassure people. As one interviewee said, ‘I know that I can just Google something, and it’s 
just at my fingertips’. There also appeared to be an acknowledgement (and acceptance) from 
the interviewees that the three different categories described above provided different types 
of information, shown in Table 1. 
Table  1:  Information  sources  and  perceptions  about  them  
Information source Speed Trustworthiness Content 
Official information 
(eg WHO, CDC) 
Slow Trustworthy; confirmed; 
accurate 
Facts, figures, 
statistics, big picture 
Professional media 
(international) 
Reasonably quick Largely trustworthy; largely 
accurate (but needs to be 
confirmed); honest; can be 
alarmist, but this can be 
‘needed to make people 
take notice’ 
Emotional, contextual, 
international coverage 
shows issues are ‘real’ 
Professional media 
(local) 
Reasonably quick May be sensationalist; 
needs to be confirmed; 
speculative 
Emotional, contextual 
Informal information Immediate ‘From the frontline’ but also 
rumour; unconfirmed 
What is really 
happening; personal 
experience 
    
Interviewees saw larger organisations (and to some extent international media) as 
being often late to respond and, while the reasons for this were appreciated, people wanted 
(trusted) information quickly. Several interviewees reported getting information: 
‘…sent to us in confidence from people in the medical body. The government didn’t 
necessarily want to share that detail of information ... it was through [informal] 
networks that we found out a lot more information than was publicly available’. 
Another reported: 
‘…some [friends] worked in public health sectors ... health departments, and 
generally I would trust them over anyone else. And they also had information much, 
much quicker. It would take days for someone like BBC or WHO to publish 
anything’. 
They also saw official and media sources as being ‘[s]terile... I mean, they were just 
numbers … but what [our friends] were telling us … it was factual, not suppressed or 
manipulated in any way’.  
The preferred source of information was someone personally known to the message 
receiver, who could be seen as having expert knowledge and/or direct experience of the 
situation. A number of the interviewees mentioned the value of information that came 
directly from friends working in the healthcare facilities where Ebola patients were being 
treated or in the Liberian Ministry of Health. This also extended to people who had 
experience from previous but similar situations as well as the current one. One interviewee in 
particular referred to the value of information coming from a colleague who had worked 
through a previous Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, while another 
interviewee, who had himself worked through an Ebola outbreak in Uganda, spoke of how 
valuable his colleagues found his previous experiences. They looked to him for advice and a 
kind of leadership. In this regard, it may be valuable, during the early stages of similar 
emergency situations, for companies to identify employees who have such experience and 
bring them into crisis planning teams in an advisory capacity. 
It was also clear from the interviews that the importance of sharing information often 
over-rode data protection rules that should have been observed around that information. 
Interviewees reported sharing information from subscription-only websites with non-
subscribers. In one case, an interviewee reported being given a friend’s personal log-in details 
and passwords so that she could access information using his subscription. This poses a 
number of risks for organisations providing subscription services, not only from the loss of 
potential revenue but also from a security point of view. It would be worth considering how 
this risk can be managed, particularly as a number of the interviewees reported that they 
began to seek information from health-specific websites they were already aware of by 
reputation but did not otherwise regularly refer to. They generally turned to trusted brands: 
The World Health Organization, the CDC Website, National Travel Health Network and 
Centre and International SOS were all mentioned. Luo and Najdawi (2004)4 found that 
branding has the most significant effect on trust building online. A number of interviewees 
reported looking for information more actively (for instance, searching for news stories ahead 
of scheduled news programmes) and more often. They also reported sharing information 
more regularly with their friends. This provides valuable lessons for how information might 
be sought out in future. 
It is interesting that the interviewees did not tend to draw a distinction between face-
to-face informal sources, such as talking with friends and colleagues, and communications 
over social media. Internal company communications, such as an organisation’s own website 
or internal e-mail group, was often thought of as belonging to this category by the company’s 
own workers, but seen more as official communication from a trusted brand by non-
employees, who reported seeking out information that had come from company 
communications from employee friends. Larger companies, particularly international 
companies, were thought of as having privileged access to information that may not be 
available to everyone (even though the company’s information may only have come from 
government sources that were available to the public). In-house briefings and regular updates 
provided by employers were reported extremely favourably by those they were intended for 
and were seen as having the accuracy of official information sources combined with the 
speed and trustworthiness of informal information. Non-employees encouraged employee 
friends to pass on information, which was seen by the secondary recipient as an official 
source of information. 
 
Consistency  of  information  
The second theme that emerged from the interviews was the importance of the information 
coming from the multiple sources to be consistent. Consistency, above all else, provided 
reassurance and helped the information to be trusted. Interviewees described putting together 
information from multiple sources (and multiple categories of sources) and then analysing it 
to construct their version of the truth. As one said: ‘some of it you take in, some of it you 
discard, some of it you take with a grain of salt, some of it was actually quite useful’. In 
doing this, they would share information from the sources they considered to be the most 
factually accurate, sharing the components of their truth construct, not the construct itself. 
Particularly reassuring was the ability to turn to consistently accurate and reliable sources to 
check, and hopefully confirm, the information constructed from the informal media sources 
and professional media. Holding regular briefings and meetings that bring together and 
communicate information from trusted official sources such as WHO, CDC and the local 
Health Ministry is therefore likely to provide significant employee reassurance. In situations 
where risk of infection may make it undesirable to bring large numbers of employees together 
in one place, companies should examine how this might be facilitated online.  
The ability to ask questions and have them answered, preferably by experts – which a 
number of local media phone-in radio shows enabled – was considered to be extremely 
valuable. While interviewees described the media as tending to sensationalise, media 
organisations were also considered to be listening to people’s concerns and trying to address 
them. This enabled company communications offices to use the media to collect information 
as well as to push it out, as it can give a sense of how the situation is being seen by the local 
population in an open information exchange. 
The interviewees reported that they and their friends and colleagues wanted to be able 
to ask questions (no matter how stupid they may seem to experts), not just be given facts and 
figures, and to be able to relate this factual information into a context that worked for them. 
The main reason for this was risk management. The individuals spoken to in this study did 
not want to be simply told what to do. They wanted some autonomy over their own decisions, 
to be able to determine the risk for themselves and make their own decisions on what level of 
risk they were willing to take. This was generally determined by two factors, the actual risk 
and the perceived risk, and where the individual felt they sat on the risk spectrum. Table 2 
gives some examples of questions that interviewees reported asking or wanting to ask around 
information given out through official information sources. 
 
Table 2: Information provided and questions asked around it 
Information given by official 
sources 
Questions/information required Further information and 
clarification required 
Medical description of 
symptoms 
Clearer description: what does 
‘gravely ill’ mean? Are they 
walking, or confined to bed? Do 
they look ill? 
What is it like that I’m familiar 
with (eg Lassa fever etc)? 
Why/how is it different? How 
will I know it’s not [Lassa]? 
How is it affecting people? How 
are they feeling? How are they 
coping? 
Geographic location (towns and 
villages) where cases have 
occurred 
How close to there is it safe to 
travel? Are the train/bus stations 
safe? 
Is it coming closer? Did the 
person catch it there or already 
have it when they travelled to 
the area? 
How many cases (numbers) 
have been recorded? 
How many dead? 
How many recovered? 
Why are some cases ‘suspected’ 
rather than ‘confirmed’? 
What will happen (to me) if I 
catch it? What sort of people 
have caught it? 
How many cases before its 
really ‘dangerous’ [to me]? 
Scientific information about 
how the disease is transmitted 
Who spread it? Why did 
healthcare workers (who should 
have known how to protect 
themselves) catch it? What can I 
do to protect myself? 
What if someone sneezes on 
me? Can I catch it from sitting 
next to someone in a taxi? From 
a doorknob? From food? 
Have people ‘like me’ caught 
it? (Occupation/socio-economic 
group etc) 
Delayed but accurate figures Earlier, estimated figures Honesty about readjustments 
and corrections to earlier 
estimates 
Geographic location of Ebola 
treatment centres 
What will happen [to me] inside 
the centre? 
What is it really like inside the 
treatment centre? 
Measures to limit disease 
spread (eg don’t shop at 
markets/don’t eat bushmeat) 
More practical information – not 
shopping at markets/eating 
bushmeat may be impossible for 
many people 
When might things change – eg 
schools close? 
What is the next best option if 
advice can’t be followed 
perfectly? 
How difficult is the disease to 
contain bearing in mind local 
resources? 
Where to call/go for help What do I do if no-one comes? 
What’s the next best option? 
Honesty when services are 
overwhelmed (and what to do) 
What not to do What can I still do? When will I 
be able to do things again? 
When might everything be back 
to normal? 
 
Risk  perception  and  managing  risk  
Most interviewees reported a preference for managed risk rather than zero risk. In the words 
of one interviewee: ‘I look more for numbers to help me make my own decisions about 
whether to avoid those areas or not ... workers on the ground need to be able to make their 
own decisions’. Some of those interviewed arrived in Liberia and Sierra Leone after the 
outbreak had begun. Others were in a position to leave but chose not to.  
Of particular interest is that none of those interviewed left Liberia or Sierra Leone 
because they personally felt at genuine risk of contracting Ebola. Those who left either did so 
because their employers made the decision for them, often from distant headquarters offices 
in the UK or the USA, (which caused resentment that the management did not genuinely 
understand the situation on the ground) or because of secondary effects of the outbreak, such 
as the introduction or threatened introduction of travel bans: ‘I was concerned that travel 
restrictions meant if I didn’t leave then it would be very difficult – in terms of cost as well as 
availability..’. The concern that health insurance would not cover them when UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office travel advice advised against remaining in-country and concern that 
should they face another health problem (a broken leg or appendicitis were offered as 
examples) the degraded healthcare system5 would not be able to treat them were also cited. 
 
Attitudes  to  personal  risk  
The interviewees demonstrated a strong ability to conceptualise risk, eg: ‘I don’t feel at any 
particular risk myself because I [...] take the necessary precautions’. They absorbed the 
information on offer and rationalised (correctly) that if they were not working in an Ebola 
Treatment Centre, nor had they touched anyone who had been diagnosed with Ebola, they 
were extremely unlikely to be infected (particularly if they took precautions regardless). Risk 
perception did change as cases began to come closer. The comment: ‘When it was in Guinea, 
and it was in the East, it wasn’t of concern to me... It was more when it came to my own area, 
it started to be of slightly more concern’, was a typical response. Another respondent said: 
‘there was a sense that people more broadly were starting to pick it up who weren’t 
necessarily family members living with the people who had had the disease. That [was] a 
tipping point for me’. 
Being able to conceptualise the risk did, however, depend on information that was 
easily understood as well as factually accurate, as the following quote identifies: 
‘[T]he information says you have to be acutely ill for the levels of Ebola virus in your 
body to be high to enough to transmit, but I would like more information on what that 
means – terms like “acutely” or “gravely ill”. What does this mean? Could they still 
be walking around? Are they bedridden? I’d like it to be more precise, so I know what 
to avoid’. 
An important part of a company being able to reassure its employees may depend on 
being able to ‘translate’ medical and scientific information into a format that can be 
understood by non-experts. A positive example of this is given by an interviewee describing 
her reaction to a briefing she and her colleagues received from a doctor invited by her 
company to talk to its employees: ‘So basically you would need to lick a sweaty person who 
is sick with the virus in order to catch it? Exactly! So that’s pretty much how it was seen’. 
 
Risk  perception  on  behalf  of  others  
During the planning and early response phases, business continuity managers and emergency 
planners will need to ask themselves not only what their approach to risk management means 
to the company’s operations and to the team in-country, but what competing interests might 
be at work. Keeping offices and operations open when other companies have closed theirs 
and withdrawn staff may give the perception that the company is putting profits before staff 
safety, but local incomes and economies may be dependent on operations continuing.  
Interviewees reported being more cautious when it came to making decisions for 
others: ‘Generally I and others are more cautious when it comes to other people’s safety than 
their own – people will do things themselves but will be more cautious about sending 
someone else to do it’. Over-managing the risk for employees on the ground, who would 
prefer to be able to make their own decisions, can give the impression that distant 
management do not really understand what is happening: ‘I mean, if they had thought about 
it, they’d realised that [...] we’re going to have an exodus of these expat workers’, said one 
respondent, ‘it means that so many of our projects and so much of our work is going to grind 
to a halt but, actually, I don’t think they thought that far ahead’. 
Pulling operations can also make the situation seem more serious than it is – 
especially to local workers and smaller companies in the area, who think the larger 
organisations have better information. The interviews suggested that smaller companies may 
look to larger ones, which are likely to have better communications teams, able to generate 
more granular information, for a steer on how to act. It is important to consider the 
consequences of this.  
Companies need to carefully consider how they might manage risk, what 
contingencies they have to consider and how and when to escalate. This may involve having 
a multi-phase emergency plan with clear distinctions between phases I, II and III, for 
example, and a clear indication of the trigger(s) that will signal a move from one phase to 
another (during both escalation and scaling down). Another important factor, which many 
interviewees mentioned, was the need to have an idea of, ‘when and how should we resume 
activities?’.  
 
Stages  of  risk  
The way in which the interviewees described and contextualised risk was broadly down to 
how immediate it was, which can be categorised as shown in Table 3. 
  
Table 3: Far at-risk, near at-risk and actual at-risk 
Far at-risk Near at-risk Real at-risk 
The individual is highly 
unlikely to be at genuine risk of 
contracting Ebola; cases may be 
present in the country but the 
interviewee is distanced from 
realistic transmission chains.  
 
Also includes geographically 
distanced friends and family of 
those at near or real-risk who 
may put pressure on them to 
leave affected regions. 
The individual is unlikely to be 
at genuine risk of contracting 
Ebola, although cases are 
present in their town or 
immediate area.  
 
The interviewee has not come 
into direct contact with Ebola 
patients nor knows anyone 
personally who has contracted 
Ebola. 
The individual may have a 
genuine chance of contracting 
Ebola.  
 
Cases of Ebola have been 
diagnosed within their 
immediate social circle or 
among colleagues. 
 
Personally knows people who 
have contracted Ebola and has 
been in physical contact with 
them. 
 
The majority of the interviewees who took part in the study belonged, or had 
belonged to at some point, the near-at-risk group, with three belonging to the real at-risk 
group (one had colleagues who had contracted Ebola while working in a treatment unit; one 
had travelled in a taxi with a colleague who was subsequently diagnosed with Ebola; one had 
been visited at home by a family friend who was subsequently diagnosed with Ebola). How 
individuals perceived themselves within these categorisations and what triggered their 
perception of moving up into a higher group is interesting. 
Interviewees generally described their perception of risk, and of moving from the 
near-at-risk to the real at-risk group in particular, as being triggered by hearing that someone 
they knew personally, or felt an affinity to, had contracted the virus. There was a definite 
sense that if ‘someone like me’ can be affected, ‘I’ might be too. In this regard, it is important 
to know who employees see as their community and ‘people like me’. One interviewee 
remarked: ‘After the two US health workers got infected, that’s when everything changed – 
people started quitting their jobs and moving overseas, NGOs were pulling out’. Others, 
interviewed earlier in the outbreak before Western NGO workers contracted the disease, 
mentioned that such an event would be likely to trigger their withdrawal from the country. 
Other Westerners were seen as much more ‘like me’ than geographically closer African 
colleagues. People generally did not seem concerned when the disease was in their country, 
nor even in their town. Concern came when someone they knew personally had it. 
‘Particularly if more than one case [happened] simultaneously’, said one interviewee. ‘If they 
made a mistake, might I?’. 
Behavioural changes, such as changing shopping habits or avoiding crowded places 
and social gatherings, seemed to kick in at the border between the near and real at-risk rather 
than at the border between far at-risk and near at-risk. Those in the far at-risk group generally 
showed more concern for people they knew in higher risk categories than for themselves. The 
geographically and socially closer that cases came, the more likely people were to start 
isolating themselves from one another and ask questions such as: Should we go out for 
dinner? Do we go out dancing anymore? Interviewees reported that people became more 
careful about shaking hands and taking shared taxis. ‘When I went out to buy groceries, it 
was based on necessity’, reported one interviewee. People began to want to work from home 
as much as was practical. Some of the concerns voiced here are shown in Table 4. 
This is interesting from a business continuity point of view. Should offices be shut 
and staff withdrawn at the trigger point between far at-risk and near-at-risk, when the office 
staff themselves appear to prefer to act when events trigger a move from near-at-risk to real-
at-risk? There may be a number of different (and competing) factors that the organisation 
needs to consider here, such as whether the reputational risk has a higher trigger point than 
the operational risk requires. Such decisions may not be influenced by the company’s direct 
interests alone. Their continuing relationship with the local government, how events are being 
reported in the media and the perception and influence of the families of employees at home 
may also influence what decisions need to be made. The economic damage caused by the 
withdrawal of an international company that contributes significantly to the economy and 
employs a large local workforce might be more devastating on a region than the impact of the 
disease itself. ‘[We] put the safety and health of our staff first, but sometimes the perception 
of what that is, is different to what it should be’, explained one interviewee. 
‘If I have a Board that is nervous around Ebola and [is asking] why are we even 
operating there anymore, why haven’t we shut down things when all the voluntary 
workers have been pulled out, it becomes hard to argue that. So you’re being pushed 
by one group to be perhaps hyper-cautious and over-react and by [others] to push 
towards “this is normal, we are managing it”’. 
As individuals moved from one risk group to another, the granularity of information 
they wanted increased. 
‘[I want to know] whether or not there are confirmed cases in [my town], how many, 
where they came from and whether that person has been out in public ... it used to be 
at the county level but now it’s more immediate. Everyone might know someone 
who’s had it and we all talk about it more, we want to know about exact locations of 
where it is in the county, which hospitals... and what do they do?’.  
The desire for information definitely increased as the perceived risk became more 
immediate. 
‘When the two US health workers got sick and a Liberian-American, Patrick Sawyer, 
died after getting off a plane in Nigeria, then I started to get Google news updates on 
Ebola. I looked for it specifically, in international media, CNN, BBC, Guardian, NY 
Times and talked about it with Liberian co-workers’. 
Interviewees reported avoiding discussing Ebola on open social forums, such as 
Facebook, so as not to worry relatives and friends at home, some of whom put pressure on 
them to leave the region; they preferred more private e-mail groups. 
 
 
Table 4: Difference in questions asked by far at-risk, near at-risk and actual at-risk 
groups 
Far at risk Near at risk Genuine at risk 
Geography of cases; where is it 
in town, country, area? 
Number of cases: how many 
cases in country, town etc 
Detail is more important; where 
to avoid travelling to 
Did I come into physical 
contact with [an infected 
person] while they might have 
been infectious? 
Statistical information; 
numbers; facts 
Developments in statistics; are 
numbers of cases increasing 
dramatically? Is it spreading 
more rapidly? 
How did [the person I 
know/identify with] catch it? 
What mistake(s) did they make? 
Scientific information; How 
does it spread? What can be 
done to contain it? 
How fast is it spreading? Why 
are containment methods not 
working? Which are working 
better? 
What should I do now? What 
can I do if professional 
healthcare cannot be accessed? 
Passively receive information 
through news channels and 
official briefings 
Actively seek information; 
share good information 
(information push as well as 
pull) 
Search for more granular 
information; exchange large 
amounts of information with 
friends and colleagues. 
Tendency to think the situation 
is being over-reported and the 
risk overemphasised 
Situation is taken more 
seriously; more awareness of 
behaviour 
Cautious behaviour 
implemented, including social 
distancing and self-isolation 
 
From an organisational perspective, a number of respondents reported a sense that a 
stronger management of the situation would have given more assurance. ‘If [....] authority 
had been involved in giving regular updates or information or reports or something like this 
on what was going on [those affected] would have [acted earlier] and would have felt that 
[the authority] was in control’ remarked one respondent. Interviewees would generally have 
preferred information earlier than have it withheld because it was incomplete or estimated: ‘it 
would have been nice if the government had just issued a warning, saying, “there’s someone 
out there, we don’t know if he’s getting on public transport, we don’t know where he’s 
going...”. you know, just knowing there are people out there who have it’. 
Interviewees would also have appreciated having warning, and explanations, of why 
the official situation had changed. ‘The official message changed from “nothing to worry 
about” to “national emergency” without sensibly managed steps in between’, explained one 
interviewee. ‘At least, that’s how it appeared to the public’. 
A last important factor for business continuity managers and emergency planners to 
consider is how, and on what timescale, the company’s operations might return to normal. 
This may include how survivors of the outbreak are re-integrated to the company and 
supported through this process. One respondent remarked: ‘I’d say it’s an incredibly 
psychologically draining disease’. It was also noticeable that, as the study went on and the 
outbreak escalated, some of the people interviewed seem to have volunteered simply so that 
they would have a chance to talk to someone for an hour: self-distancing by staying at home 
was isolating and lonely. Long-term psychological support might be needed to address this. 
 
DISCUSSION  
There are clearly important lessons to be learned for business continuity from how the people 
interviewed sought, absorbed and processed information during the Ebola crisis. This will 
help companies to be aware of what kind of information employees require at different stages 
of an outbreak; how to formulate and distribute effective messages to employees, the media 
and international offices of the company; who to work with to formulate information; and 
how employees might act on it. 
The most important component of a message was the sender. This was much more 
influential than the platform through which it was received. In most cases, interviewees could 
not recall how they had received the information, just what category of sender it had come 
from (informal, official information or professional media). They absorbed information from 
multiple sources and the more immediate they perceived the risk to be, the more likely they 
were to actively seek out information. They were most assured when consistent messages 
came from multiple sources. They did not mind receiving incomplete or estimated 
information, or information that was corrected later, and appreciated that information may not 
always be perfect. A lack of any information was seen as a failure to manage and control the 
situation. Information requirements differed depending on how immediate the risk was 
perceived to be; the closer the risk, the more granular the information required became. 
Socioeconomic closeness (‘someone like me’), often defined by occupation or race, made the 
risk more immediate than geographical closeness. 
While the media was considered to sensationalise information, the interviewees 
expected this and saw media sources as less likely to be reliable than others and so would try 
to corroborate them with official information sources and trusted informal sources. The 
media proved valuable as a platform for listening to people’s concerns, however, and for 
trying to address them, particularly when this could be done quickly. In West Africa, where 
Internet penetration is still low (only 4.6 per cent of the population have Internet access in 
Liberia, 1.7 per cent in Sierra Leone and 1.8 per cent in Guinea),6 this was best achieved by 
radio phone-in talk shows. It suggests a greater application in future or in regions with better 
Internet penetration for website discussion forums that can run question and answer (Q&A) 
sessions. While utilised mostly by those far at-risk, the discussion website Reddit 
(www.reddit.com) ran a particularly successful Q&A session on Ebola7 and an edited set of 
frequently asked questions 8 prepared by the site was picked up by international newspapers. 
 
LIMITATIONS  OF  THE  STUDY  
There are a number of limitations that must be considered with regard to the results of this 
study. First, the study was designed very quickly, so that the opportunity to interview people 
directly experiencing the Ebola crisis, while it was unfolding, would not be lost. There are 
undoubtedly more robust methodologies that could have been used and apologies are made 
for any compromise this caused to the results.  
Secondly, the survey sample was very small (n=14) and was recruited largely through 
purposive (convenience) sampling and self-selection. It represented a very narrow 
demographic – foreign workers who were outsiders to the affected West African region and 
socio-economically elite from the affected indigenous populations. They were better 
educated, wealthier, had better access to healthcare and were in a position to leave the region 
should they choose to do so. It should not be assumed that the responses they gave are 
representative of anything other than themselves and may not be transferable to either the 
populations of Western Europe and North America, from which they originated during a local 
health emergency, nor to international workers stationed in other regions of the world during 
a health emergency that might occur elsewhere. Any assumptions made along those lines 
would need to be tested in the appropriate contexts. 
Thirdly, the interviews were originally written and set-up in order to ask the group 
about their social media use in relation to Ebola but in general, social media was not a 
particularly relevant component of health seeking information for the survey sample. This 
was partly due to barriers to social media access in West Africa, including poor internet 
penetration creating infrastructure barriers even to those who are in an economic position to 
afford it, but did also appear to be due to a preference to take information from traditional 
media and official sources more than informal sources accessed via social media platforms. 
Any social media use was seen as an additional, informal source of information, not the 
preferred one, and the importance of consistency between messages from multiple sources 
was seen as paramount; this is consistent with findings from other studies.9 Finally, the 
interpretation of the qualitative data provided by the interviewees has been analysed by the 
lead author only, and therefore may be influenced by inherent biases. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
Despite its limitations, the study suggests some valuable insights that may assist business 
continuity plans during future health emergencies. Due to the unexpected emergence of 
serious infectious disease outbreaks and reasonably quick onset, it would be valuable for 
planners to familiarise themselves with the type of questions that those affected are likely to 
ask, so that appropriate answers might be formulated quickly. They should also be aware that 
people have different questions depending on whether they are (or perceive themselves to be) 
‘far at-risk’, ‘near at-risk’ or ‘real at-risk’. 
Interviewees described triggers that would move their perception that they were ‘far 
at-risk’ to ‘near at-risk’ as cases being identified in ‘other NGO workers/other Westerners’, 
regardless of the NGO/organisation by which they were employed or where the case of 
infection was located. ‘Someone I know’, regardless of whether the interviewee had come 
into physical contact with the infected person during a relevant period also resulted in a 
perception that they were now in the ‘real at-risk’ group. Interestingly, although all of the 
Western NGO workers who became infected with Ebola were in extremely high-risk 
categories (healthcare workers who had been directly in contact with Ebola victims in 
medical facilities) where some cases of infection may have been considered inevitable, the 
reports of their infection heightened concern amongst the near at-risk and far-at risk groups. 
Emergency planners should take note of these triggers. While the immediacy of risk 
can be defined in geographic terms, such as whether cases of infection have been detected in 
the same country, the same town or the same street as the at-risk individual, risk perception is 
at least as dependent on emotional and perceptual factors such as the socio-economic or 
social group in which cases are occurring. Cases identified in workers employed by the same 
or a similar company, even if they are based in a geographically distant office, may result in a 
greater perception of risk than geographically closer cases identified in a socio-economic 
group with which the at-risk individual does not identify. Whether business continuity plans 
are enacted and operations are suspended are based primarily on real or perceived risk needs 
careful consideration. 
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